New Disclosure Rules for Bank Wealth Management Products Take Effect in September 2026; Firms Shift Benchmarks

The Measures for the Administration of Information Disclosure of Asset Management Products of Banking and Insurance Institutions will come into force on September 1, 2026. As the implementation date approaches, several wealth management companies have accelerated compliance adjustments. CMB Wealth Management, Industrial Bank Wealth Management, China Post Financial, Guangyin Wealth Management, Minsheng Wealth Management, Ping An Wealth Management, and Schroder Bank of Communications Wealth Management have recently announced changes to the performance comparison benchmarks of multiple products, shifting from fixed or range-based values to index-linked formulas.

Schroder Bank of Communications Wealth Management changed a product's benchmark from "1.60%–3.00%" to "60% × the People's Bank of China (PBOC) demand deposit rate + 40% × the ChinaBond New Composite All-Price (under 1 year) Index return." Guangyin Wealth Management revised a product's benchmark from "1.90%–2.40%" to "50% × the PBOC demand deposit rate + 50% × the ChinaBond New Composite All-Price (under 1 year) Index return."

In a low-interest-rate environment, the central tendency of fixed-income asset returns has declined. If wealth management products maintain high numerical or range-based benchmarks, managers may be pushed to take on credit risk or leverage to achieve higher returns, accumulating risk. Failure to meet actual returns can also trigger investor complaints. Range-based benchmarks are often perceived as implicit return promises, weakening the awareness of net-value-based products. Switching to index-linked benchmarks shifts the evaluation logic from "meeting absolute return targets" to "relative benchmark orientation," prompting managers to focus more on investment strategy and generate excess returns while controlling tracking error. The core problem with numerical and range-based benchmarks is "static numbers versus a dynamic market": in a low-interest-rate environment, the central tendency of returns continues to decline, making actual returns prone to persistent deviation from benchmarks. Frequent downward adjustments to track the market would conflict with the Measures' requirement that "performance comparison benchmarks shall not be adjusted in principle," which is the main reason wealth management companies are rushing to "re-anchor" before implementation.

Current market feedback indicates that some retail investors say they cannot understand the index-linked benchmark formulas and find product selection more difficult without a direct numerical reference. Wealth management companies can address this in two ways: first, by "translating" the benchmarks—explaining in plain language in product prospectuses and sales pages what the benchmark composition and weightings mean, supplemented with illustrative calculations under different market scenarios; second, by regularly disclosing comparisons of actual product returns against benchmarks and the extent of outperformance, using visual curves to present both on the same chart, building investor trust in the new benchmark system through consistent, ongoing information.

After the Measures take effect, market competition will place greater emphasis on investment management capability and information transparency, and industry divergence will intensify. The Measures will push asset management institutions to focus on improving management capabilities and force the industry to return to its net-value-based roots. For the first time, the Measures unify disclosure rules for wealth management, trust, and insurance asset management products under the principle of "same business, same standards," covering the full lifecycle of product fundraising, duration, and termination, making product sales "clear," risks "distinguishable," and returns "calculable," essentially protecting investors' right to know and choose.

From a competitive logic perspective, institutions previously used performance comparison benchmarks as "quasi-quotes" to attract clients. After the new rules, benchmark setting will be more standardized and transparent, making it difficult to rely on inflated figures to attract capital. Competition will shift toward investment research capability, asset allocation, drawdown control, and client servicing.

The Measures also impose several hard requirements, including look-through disclosure of the top ten underlying assets, a unified information disclosure platform, and standardized presentation of historical performance. Some large and medium-sized wealth management companies have begun implementation, but for the industry, look-through disclosure still faces many difficulties. It involves multi-layered nested assets, complex data acquisition and accounting, and high system construction costs for small and medium-sized institutions. The unified disclosure platform requires standardized data interfaces across institutions, which is difficult to coordinate. Historical performance presentation standards require comprehensive and transparent disclosure that does not mislead investors, and the calibration of enforcement is challenging. Look-through disclosure requires periodic reports of public offerings to list the top ten assets before and after look-through separately. Given the large number of wealth management products, look-through involves vast amounts of data and information, requiring mature systems and algorithms. The unified disclosure platform requires that content on various distribution channels' apps and official websites be strictly consistent with China Wealth Management Network, posing significant challenges for internal coordination and system integration.

Historical performance presentation standards require thoroughly correcting the practice of selectively highlighting high returns while avoiding low-return periods. This involves clearing and delisting promotional materials and re-standardizing sales personnel behavior, making the rectification chain lengthy.